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LEGAL PROFESSION

Residency Requirements for Attorneys.·
Home Is Where the License Is?
by Neal Devins

FACTS

Supreme Court of New Hampshire

v.
Piper
(Docket No. 83-1466)

To be argued October 31, 1984
ISSUES

In our federal system, states' rights frequently con·
flict with our interstate marketplace and the rights of
American citizens to be afforded the same "privileges
and immunities" in each state of the union. Supreme
Court of New Hampshire v. Piper depicts one of these
conflicts-the ability of states to regulate the practice of
law. More specifically, the Piper case is concerned with
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire's rule prohibit·
ing nonresidents from becoming members of the state
bar.
Residence requirements are troublesome because
free market principles temper the Constitution-prin·
ciples which condemn anticompetitive practices. At the
same time, our nation is a conglomerate of fifty indivi·
dual states, each of which has unique laws, unique court
systems and unique standards for lawyer competency.
Consequently, our federal system demands that states
have leeway to structure their legal system.
Where national values end and states' rights begin is
the subject matter of Piper. Should deference be given to
flausible state justifications for the residency requirement, or must the state affirmatively demonstrate its
need for the residency requirements? Since lawyers are
"officers of the [state] court," should the state have more
leeway in regulating the legal profession? And what, if
any, weight should be accorded to the Supreme Court's
recent trend of approving government rulemaking?
The Court should provide answers to these questions
in this case. Piper concerns the Privileges and Immuni·
ties clause, which protects out-of-state workers' rights to
seek employment in the open marketplace. It questions
both the applicability of this protection to the New
Hampshire residency requirement and the standard
used in implementing this protection.

Neal Devins is an allomey with the Civil Rights Commission,
1121 Vermont Avmue, NW, Washing/on, DC 20425; telephone(202) 376-8372.

Kathryn Piper, a Vermont resident, sought to become a member of the New Hampshire bar. After signing a statement of intent to establish residency in New
Hampshire, Piper took and passed the February, 1980,
New Hampshire bar. She subsequently requested dispensation from the residency requirement because of
alleged personal circumstances. The New Hampshire
Supreme Court denied her request.
In March of 1982, Piper brought suit in federal
district court, alleging that the residency requirement
violated, among other things, the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The district court upheld her daim (539 F.
Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982)). A divided panel of the First
Circuit United States Court of Appeals reversed this
ruling (708 F.2d 825 (1st Cir. 1983)). However, this
initial appellate court ruling was reversed upon en bane
reconsideration (i.e., a proceeding in which all the First
Circuit appellate judges participated) (723 F.2d 98
{1983)).
The thrust of Piper's claim concerns the constitutional requirement that: "The citizens of each state shall
be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states." According to the Supreme Court,
this provision "prevents a state from discriminating
against citizens of other states in favor of its own." (Hague v. Commillee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496,
511 (1939)). Piper, citing several Supreme Court cases,
claims that: "To justify discrimination under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the state must establish the
existence of a 'substantial reason' and as part of this
justification show that nonresidents 'constitute a peculiar source of evil at which the discrimination is aimed' ...
[as well as] show that 'the degree of discrimination bears
a close relation' to the reasons presented, as justification." For Piper, the state has failed to meet this burden
of justification.
The state, however, challenges Piper's position on
two grounds. First, it claims that its residency requirement does not implicate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. It supports this argument with the allegation
that "state court control over bar membership involves
an activity which is directly connected and bound u'p
with the state's exercise of its judicial power, rather than
an interest fundamental to the promotion of interstate
harmony." For the state, its requirement is not an economic regulation. Thus, according to New Hampshire,
state concerns outweigh the need to apply the Privileges

64

PREVIEW
HeinOnline -- 1984-1985 Preview U.S. Sup. Ct. Cas. 64 1984-1985

and Immunities Clause. In support of this claim, the
state points to the Supreme Court's admonition that "the
national government will fare best if the states and their
institutions are free to perform their separate functions
in their separate ways." (Youuger v. Han·is, 401 U.S. 37
(1971)).
The state's second argument, that it has adequate
justification for prohibiting nonresident applications to
the state bar, centers around the standards that should
govern Privileges and Immunities Clause analysis. The
state claims that deference should be accorded to the
New Hampshire Supreme Court ruling that New
Hampshire's substantial interest in promoting "the continued validity of a competent, stable and well informed
state bar" supports the residency requirement. The state
further notes that the residency requirement is substantially related to the New Hampshire Supreme Court's
views of the obligations of New Hampshire lawyers. The
state then delineates the "peculiar evils" posed by nonresident applicants: "[N]onresident attorneys, once admitted, are less likely to remain familiar with legal rules
and procedures and less likely to keep attuned to local
conditions which may affect the needs of their local
clients. Similarly, nonresident attorneys are less likely to
be subject to local peer pressure which imposes informal, but powerful curbs on unethical or incompetent
conduct through the regular practice of law in a relatively small and closely knit legal community. Also, nonresident attorneys are less likely to be available for court
appearances, disciplinary proceedings and participation
in the voluntary activities of a unified bar." Because of
these alleged dangers, the state argues that its residency
requirement places a justifiable burden on out-of-state
applicants.
Piper disputes both claims proffered by the New
Hampshire Supreme Court. First, she argues that the
New Hampshire residency rule is indeed subject to scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Citing
the Supreme Court's 1984 ruling in United Buildiug v.
Camden ( 104 S.Ct. at 1028), that the clause is triggered
by "discrimination against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental concern," Piper argues that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause is not restricted to
economic regulation. She further argues that there
should be no "political function" exemption because
lawyers are "officers of the court." To support this contention, Piper points to a Supreme Court Equal Protection Clause ruling which held that a law license does not
"place one so close to the core of the r..olitical process as
to make him a formulator of government policy." (/11 re
Griffiths,413 U.S. 717, 729(1973)).
After arguing that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause should apply to her case, Piper contends that the
state cannot justify its residency requirement under the
clause. Upon reviewing the state's proffered justifications for the residency rule, she concludes that the state

has "failed to provide any legitimate substantial reason
for its residency rule which is closely related to the actual
terms of that rule." Specifically, Piper alleges: I) residency is not necessarily related to where an attorney
intends to practice, for she intended to join a New
Hampshire law office; 2) since residents, upon leaving
the state, do not lose their bar membership, the residency requirement is not rationally related to the Supreme Court's stated objectives; 3) there is no reason to
think that the bar exam could not adequately test nonresidents' familiarity with local rules and procedures, and
4) there is no·reason to think that out-of-state attorneys
are either unconcerned with their reputations or unavailable for court appearances or other required activities.
In addition to suggesting that the state has failed to
adequately support its residency requirement, Piper
notes that less restrictive alternatives are available to the
state to ensure adequate commitment to the New
Hampshire Bar. For example, she suggests that nonresident attorneys could be compelled to maintain a New
Hampshire office.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The holding in Piper will be significant for several
reasons. Most obviously, the case will have great practical impact on nonresident attorneys interested in being
licensed in states with residency requirements. Several
states now require (or are considering requiring) that
bar applicants must either be a resident of the state or
intend to open a law office in the state. For this reason,
amicus briefs supporting the New Hampshire Supreme
Court were filed by several states, including Tennessee,
Iowa, Virginia, Missouri, and Ohio. For identical reasons, an amicus brief in support of Kathryn Piper was
filed by the Vermont Bar Association.
Piper also is noteworthy to consumers of legal services. New Hampshire's residency requirement is, in part,
a consumer regulation. In its brief, the· state suggests
that nonresident attorneys will provide inadequate legal
services. Yet Ralph Nader's Public Citizens, Inc. and the
American Corporate Counsel Association filed amicus
briefs arguing that the state residency requirement improperly interferes with consumer choice. Public Citizens claims that the end of "assuring that clients will be
well served by honest and capable attorneys" is best
accomplished "by allowing qualified nonresidents to become members of the New Hampshire Bar and thereby
increase the pool of attorneys available to represent
clients." The consumerism argument advanced by the
American Corporate Counsel speaks to the needs of
corporations to have in-house attorneys represent them
in court, on the reasoning these attorneys are intimately
familiar with both the internal workings of the corporations they represent and the industries served by those
corporations.
In addition to these practical aspects, Piper will give
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the Court an opportunity to speak generally about such
concerns as the nature of legal practice and the balancing of states' rights with constitutional protections
against anticompetitive state practices. Of particular interest is the question of whether bar examiners increased reliance on multistate examinations combined
with the growth of "national" Jaw firms has weakened
the state's interest in regulating the legal profession.
The case also raises a significant issue that could
impact on future Privileges and Immunities Clause jurisprudence. When government largesse is at issue,
should the state be accorded more deference in regulations impacting on nonresidents than when free-standing regulations are at issue? Last term, the Supreme
Court approved a residency requirement imposed by
Camden, New Jersey, on public works contracts. If the
Courl now upholds Piper's claim, the largesse-regulation distinction could prove dispositive.
ARGUMENTS

For Kathryn Piper (Cout1sel of Record, jon Meyer, I 16 Lowell
Street, P. 0. Box 516, J"'anchester, NH 03105; telephone (603)
668-7272)
I. The New Hampshire residency rule is subject to
Privileges and Immunities Clause scrutiny.
2. The New Hampshire residency rule violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause as the state has failed to

provide any legitimate, substantial reason for the residency rule which is closely related to the actual terms
of the rule.
3. 'fhe New Hampshire residency requirement violates
the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. (These
issues were not of such significance as to merit discussion.)
For the Supreme Court of New Hampshire (CourlSe/ of
Record, Marlin L. Gross, 9 Capitol Street, P. 0. Box I 256,
Concord, NH 03301; telephone (603) 224-2341)
I. New Hampshire's residency requirement is bo.und up
with the state's exercise of its judicial power and thus
does not trigger Privileges and Immunities Clause
scrutiny.
2. If the Privileges and Immunities Clause is invoked,
substantial deference should be accorded the policy
determination made by the state of New Hampshire.
3. New Hampshire satisfies the Privileges and Immunities Clause test since the residency requirement is
substantially related to the state supreme court's view
of the obligations of New Hampshire lawyers.
AMICUS ARGUMENTS

Parties and positions of the amici have been summarized in the "Background and Significance" section.
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